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DEATH AS A BARGAINING CHIP: PLEA BARGAINING 
AND THE FUTURE OF VIRGINIA'S DEATH PENALTY 
John G. Douglass * 
Virginia now averages less than a single death sentence each 
year,1 a far cry from its not-too-distant history as the second most 
active death penalty state in the nation. 2 The numbers alone 
tempt us to forecast the death of Virginia's death penalty: a death 
by disuse. But those numbers leave much of the story untold. The 
plummeting number of death sentences is only the diminishing 
tip of a larger, more stable iceberg of capital case litigation. That 
iceberg is melting very slowly, if at all. 
Though death sentences are increasingly rare, capital indict-
ments are not. Even as death sentences decline, capital charging 
in Virginia persists at a relatively stable rate.3 As a result, Vir-
ginia prosecutors now charge about twenty cases of capital mur-
der annually for each case that results in a death sentence.1 
What happens to the other nineteen cases? Plea bargaining 
fills much of that gap. Today, even more than in years past, Vir-
ginia's death penalty functions primarily as a bargaining chip in 
* Profes~or of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. My thanks to David 
Johnson and Maria Jankowski for helpful insights. Thanks also to D.J. Geiger, the princi-
pal author of the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission Report, see infra Part I.D, for her 
thoroughness in assembling and organizing data on capital indictments. And thanks to 
Laura Joseph for very capable assistance with research. 
1. Since 2004, Virginia courts have sentenced nine people to death. Death Sentences 
in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http:// 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015) [hereinafter Death Sentences by State/Year]. 
2. Virginia has executed 110 people in the post-1976 "modern" era of the death pen-
alty. Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-execu tions-state-and-region-197 6 (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Executions by State]. Prior to 2014, that placed Virginia second 
behind Texas's 508 executions. Id. In 2014, Oklahoma executed three individuals and now 
occupies second position with 111 executions. Id. 
3. VA. INDIGENT DEF'. COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE CAPITAL DEFENDER OFFICES apps. A, 
B (2013) [hereinafter VIDC HEVIEW]; see infra Part I.D. 
4. Id. 
873 
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a plea negotiation process that resolves most capital litigation 
with sentences less than death. 5 Virginia prosecutors have not 
abandoned the death penalty. Instead, increasingly, they bargain 
with it. 
This reality has important implications for the future of Virgin-
ia's death penalty. This symposium essay addresses two related 
concerns. The first relates to fairness. The second relates to cost. 
First, fairness. Because charging and plea negotiation decisions 
are made by independently elected commonwealth's attorneys 
across Virginia, and because different prosecutors make those de-
cisions very differently, it has long been true that the locality 
where a murder occurs is a principal factor in determining who 
gets death, and who gets life. 6 While plea negotiations may bring 
fewer death sentences, an imbalance remains across jurisdictions 
in both capital indictments and death sentences.7 If our aim is 
like treatment of like cases across the Commonwealth, we remain 
a long way from achieving that aim. 
This leads to a second concern: cost. Because so many capital 
cases are resolved by post-indictment plea bargaining, after much 
of the time-consuming work of investigators, prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and experts has already taken place, the financial costs 
of our death penalty system will remain relatively high, despite 
the decline in actual death sentences.8 In a world of limited re-
sources and tight budgets, that cost is likely to attract increasing 
concern. 
5. See infra Part I.D. 
6. See JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REvmw OF 
VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 27-31, (2002) [hereinafter JLARC REPORT], 
available at jlarc.virginia.gov/reports/Rpt274.pdf; infra Part I.F. 
7. See infra Part I.F. 
8. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Re-
quired to Post a Bond to Seeh the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861, 861-66 (2007) 
(discussing the cost-benefit "disconnect" in a national context). Many of those costs are 
borne by statewide budgets rather than by local taxpayers. Id. at 864. But the bargaining 
"advantages" of the death penalty are not spread evenly across the state. Id. at 862-63. 
Those advantages go only to prosecutors willing to use death as a bargaining chip, and 
most heavily to those who use that chip routinely. Id. at 876--77. Hence there is a political 
"disconnect" between those who seek the advantage of death bargaining and those who 
bear the costs. Id. As cost-related arguments gain prominence in the death penalty debate, 
this "disconnect" may emerge as a central element in that debate. Id. at 893. The many 
are paying for the tactical advantage of the few. 
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Modest and achievable reforms would both promote fairness 
and reduce costs with little impact on current sentencing out-
comes. That kind of reform should interest policymakers regard-
less of their views on the death penalty. This symposium essay 
concludes by outlining those possibilities for the future. 
I. THE PAST AND PRESENT: CAPITAL CHARGING PERSISTS AT A 
RELATIVELY STABLE RATE IN VIRGINIA WHILE PLEA BARGAINING 
INCREASINGLY RESOLVES CASES SHORT OF DEA'l'H SENTENCES 
A. The Decline of Death Sentences 
The numbers tell us that the death penalty is in retreat across 
the world, across the United States, and in Virginia.9 Viewed in 
light of human history across centuries, the decline of capital 
punishment is unmistakable. 10 After all, Henry VIII's royal courts 
condemned more prisoners to death in an average week than Vir-
ginia sentenced to death in the past decade. 11 In the United 
States, death sentences have declined for most of the past twenty 
years. 12 Since a post-Furman1a high of over 300 death sentences 
per year in the mid-1990s, death sentences have dropped steadily 
to about eighty per year. 1·1 
9. STEVEN PINKEH, THE BETTER ANGELS OF Oun NATURI,: WHY VIOLENCE HAS 
DECLINED 149-50 (2011); Death Sentences by State/Year, supra note 1. 
10. PINKER, supra note 9, at 149-53. 
11. Compare PINKER, supra note 9, at 149 (discussing Henry VIII's rate of execution), 
with Executions by State, supra note 2 (showing a consistent decline in death penalty use 
in the United States). Most of the world, and virtually all of Europe, has abolished death 
as a punishment for crime. PINKEH, supra note 9, at 149-50. Six American states have 
abolished capital punishment in the past decade. States With and Without the Death Pen· 
alty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-
death-penalty (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). Not surprisingly, observers typically look at the· 
se numbers and predict a future with no death penalty. See PINKER, supra note 9, at 150-
53 (discussing reasons for the movement away from the death penalty internationally, and 
finding that abolishing death as a punishment had no observable consequences). To some, 
the future is now: "(E]ven the American death penalty, for all its notoriety, is more sym· 
bolic than real," writes Steven Pinker in his comprehensive study of human violence. Id. at 
150. 
12. See Death Sentences by Year: 1976-2012, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http:// 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-year-1977-2009 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) 
[hereinafter Death Sentences by Year]. 
13. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (holding that the death penalty 
as implemented in several states would "constitute cruel and unusual punishment in vio-
lation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"). 
14. Death Sentences by Year, supra note 12. 
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Virginia's recent history mirrors the national trend. For three 
decades following Furman, Virginia executed more people than 
any state but Texas, 15 and did so more "efficiently"-meaning a 
higher percentage of death sentences resulted in execution, and 
did so more quickly after death sentence-than any other state.16 
From 1995 to 1999, Virginia courts were still averaging about five 
death sentences per year.11 Since 2004, however, death sentences 
in those same courts diminished to less than one per year. 18 Since 
the sentencing of Robert Charles Gleason, Jr. in 2011, 19 Virginia 
has produced no new death sentences.20 
B. The ''Funneling" Process in Capital Cases 
While death sentences are in steep decline, death penalty cases 
are not. The docket of capital litigation in Virginia remains much 
larger than the comparatively few death sentences that it produc-
es.21 This is because most capital cases are resolved before trial 
through a "winnowing" or "funneling" process.22 At the top of the 
funnel, the process begins with dozens of arrests for capital-
eligible crimes. 2:i As cases move down the funnel through indict-
ment and pretrial litigation, we see capital cases turned into non-
capital dispositions, sometimes through unilateral prosecutorial 
choice, but most often by a negotiated guilty plea to something 
15. Executions by State, supra note 2. 
16. See AM. BAR ASS'N, EVALUATING FAIHNESS AND ACCUHACY IN STATE DEATH 
PENALTY SYS'l'f~MS: 'l'HE VIRGINIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 1 (2013) [hereinaf-
ter ABA ASSESSMENT]; King Salim Khalfani & Stephen A. Northup, Virginia and the 
Death Penalty, DAILY PROGHESS (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/vir 
ginia-and-the-death-penalty/article_9a0b7 dee-7 5f7-5364-940a-ba2236e2545b.html ?mode= 
jqm ("The average time between conviction and execution in Virginia is less than eight 
years, by far the shortest in the nation."). 
17. Death Sentences by State/Year, supra note 1. 
18. Id. 
19. Gleason, a death row prisoner who killed another inmate, told the court he would 
kill again and essentially asked for the death penalty. See Gleason v. Commonwealth, 726 
S.E.2d 351, 352, 354 (Va. 2012). 
20. Virginia Capital Litigation Data, VA. CAP. CASE CLEAHINGHOUSE, http://www. 
vc3.org/resources/page.asp?pageid=561 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter VCCC Da-
ta] (compiling data in an excel spreadsheet accessible through the hyperlink). 
21. See JLARC REPOHT, supra note 6, at 16-17 (noting that from 1995-1999 out of 
215 capital-eligible cases only 24 resulted in death sentences). 
22. For a visual depiction of this "funnel," see id. at IL 
23. See id. at 16-17 (noting that from 1995-1999 there were 215 arrests that were eli-
gible for capital punishment). 
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less than a death sentence.21 At the narrow bottom of the funnel, 
a handful of cases go to trial where contests over guilt-or, more 
typically, over sentencing-winnow a bit more.25 Those contested 
cases produce a trickle of death sentences at the exit of the fun-
nel.2c 
This funneling process has little to do with the legislature, or 
even the judiciary. It has a fair amount to do with the skill and 
tenacity of defense lawyers. It has lots to do with the discretion of 
prosecutors. 
As for the legislature, Virginia's broad capital murder statute 
allows for a wide open entrance at the top of the funnel. 21 Capital 
murder encompasses fifteen different categories of intentional 
homicide, 28 including (the most frequently charged) killing in the 
commission of robbery. 29 Steal the victim's wallet and "ordinary" 
murder becomes capital-eligible.30 Once the capital murder is 
proved, Virginia's statutory prerequisites for a death sentence 
leave plenty of room for discretion. The jury can vote death if it 
finds the defendant's conduct "vile, horrible or inhuman" or if it 
finds defendant "a continuing serious threat to society."31 
As for the judiciary, Virginia law provides two opportunities for 
courts to participate in the funneling process by exercising judg-
ment that a case does not merit a death sentence. 32 First, after a 
jury votes death, a Virginia court may set aside the death sen-
tence and impose a life sentence. 33 That power is entirely discre-
tionary and may be exercised "upon good cause shown."31 
24. See, e.g., id. at 43. 
25. See id. at 16-17; Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CHIMINOLOGY 475, 487-88 (2013) (discussing the incentives for going to trial in death-
penalty cases). 
26. See JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 17. 
27. See id. at 14 (recognizing the increase in capital-eligible arrests as a result of leg-
islative expansion of the capital murder statute). 
28. VA. Com~ ANN. § 18.2-31 (Repl. Vol. 2014). Virginia's history of expanding the 
number of offenses eligible for the death penalty is outlined in ABA ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 16, at 5 & n.37.; see also JLAHC Report, supra note 6, at 8-11. 
29. VA. COIJE ANN.§ 18.2-31; see JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 16, 30. 
30. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31. 
31. Id. § 19.2-264.2. 
32. Notably, Virginia courts have no discretion before trial to determine that death is 
an inappropriate punishment. See In re Horan, 634 S.E.2d 675, 678-79 (Va. 2006). 
33. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5. 
34. Id. 
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Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia must review every 
death sentence to determine whether it is "excessive or dispropor-
tionate."35 Though legislation explicitly grants these judicial pow-
ers, courts almost never exercise them to winnow out questiona-
ble death sentences. Of the dozens of death sentences voted by 
juries in the post-Furman decades, Virginia trial judges have 
found "good cause" to set aside only a tiny fraction. 36 And the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has never found a death sentence "exces-
sive or disproportionate."37 
At trial, of course, juries typically make the ultimate choice of 
life or death,38 but the vast majority of capital cases never get to a 
jury verdict. 39 Most of the funneling occurs before that. 4° Fifteen to 
twenty years ago, prosecutors winnowed out about 60% of capital 
murder indictments before trial with-usually bargained for-
choices not to seek death, 41 Now that winnowing process disposes 
of close to 90% of capital murder indictments.42 Virginia juries ul-
35. Id.§ 17.l-313(C). 
36. I have found no record of a Virginia trial court reducing a jury verdict of death 
penalty to a lesser sentence based on "good cause." Accounts of practitioners suggest it al-
most never happens. The ABA assessment does not mention any case where such a reduc-
tion occurred. See generally ABA ASSESSMENT, supra note 16 (lacking any example of a 
court's exercising its discretion under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.5). 
37. See ABA ASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 218; JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at IV 
(noting that none of 119 death sentences in its study were found disproportionate by the 
Supreme Court of Virginia); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(C). In theory at least there 
are scenarios in which Virginia trial judges play a role in selecting life or death. If the case 
is tried to the court without a jury, the judge has the power to sentence. But in Virginia 
both parties must waive jury before the court is empowered to try and sentence. A prose-
cutor seeking a death sentence is unlikely to concur in a jury waiver where he believes the 
court is inclined to life. And a defendant is unlikely to waive a jury in front of a judge in-
clined toward a death sentence. Hence jury waivers, when they occur, tend to come as part 
of an agreement where the prosecutor agrees not to pursue death. In a few cases where 
the evidence of guilt is clear and the defendant calculates the chances for a life sentence 
are stronger without a jury, defendants have entered guilty pleas to capital murder (i.e., 
without a plea agreement binding on the court) and courts have sentenced to life. The risk 
in that tactic, of course, is that the defendant acknowledges guilt with no guarantee that 
he will avoid a death sentence. See Dubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 636, 639 (Va. 
1993) (affirming a death sentence entered by a trial judge following a guilty plea despite 
the commonwealth's recommendation of a life sentence). 
38. The JLARC report documented jury sentencings in 53% of cases where the prose-
cutor sought death all the way through a contested verdict. JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, 
at 49, 52. 
39. See id. at 16-17. 
40. See id. at 16. 
41. See id. at II, 35-36, 40-41 (finding that prosecutors actively sought the death pen-
alty through a contested verdict in only 64 of 170 cases indicted as capital murder). 
42. See infra Part I.D. 
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timately decide life or death in only about 8% of indicted capital 
murder cases. 13 
Prosecutors, more than legislators, courts, or juries, control the 
funnel. Virginia commonwealth's attorneys control the entrance 
to the funnel when they decide whether to present an indictment 
for capital murder to a grand jury.44 After a capital indictment is 
filed and defense counsel is appointed, negotiations between 
prosecutors and defense attorneys largely determine whether a 
defendant will ever face a trial or sentencing where death is actu-
ally contested. 45 
C. Winnowing by the Numbers: A Tale of Two Studies 
Before I get too deep into the numbers, I will offer a few words 
about the sources and the limits of the data I have examined. 
First, a word about sources: In large measure, the numbers 
come from two studies undertaken more than a decade apart. The 
studies offer snapshots of death penalty case processing in Virgin-
ia during two (roughly) five-year periods, 1995 to 1999 and 2008 
to 2013, and hence give us some idea of trends across almost 
twenty years. 
The first study was published in 2002 by the Joint Legislative 
Audit and Review Commission of the Virginia General Assembly 
("JLARC"). 46 JLARC undertook the study in response to concerns 
about the uneven exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the appli-
cation of Virginia's death penalty. 47 JLARC staff reviewed data 
from Virginia State Police arrests, Sentencing Commission rec-
ords of case dispositions, and-in a smaller sample of cases-
commonwealth's attorneys' case files. 18 The JLARC data covered 
capital crimes occurring between 1995 and 1999.19 To date, the 
43. Id. 
44. See .JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at IV, 17. 
45. See Susan Ehrhard, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty: An Exploratory 
Study, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 313, 323 (2008). 
46. JLARC REPOHT, supra note 6, at I. 
47. The principal concern giving rise to the JLARC study was the perception of racial 
disparity in capital punishment. The principal conclusion of the study, however, was that 
prosecutors in highly populated localities were much less likely to seek the death penalty 
than their counterparts in less populated jurisdictions. Id. at Preface, iii-iv, 28. 
48. Id. at 19-23. 
49. Id. at 12, 19. JLARC chose 1995 as the starting point because that was the year 
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JLARC study remains the most comprehensive study of prosecu-
torial discretion in Virginia death penalty cases.50 
The second study was documented in a 2013 report by the Vir-
ginia Indigent Defense Commission ("VIDC") to the General As-
sembly, and it analyzed the caseloads of the four regional Capital 
Defender Offices ("CDOs") that defend a substantial portion of 
Virginia's capital cases.51 During the 2013 session, the General 
Assembly directed VIDC to undertake a study in order to deter-
mine whether, in light of the declining number of death sentenc-
es, resources committed to capital defense should be reallocated 
to other tasks. 02 VIDC staff combed through court records and 
CDO case files to identify capital cases charged from 2008 
through October 2013.53 VIDC found that, despite declining death 
sentences, the workload at regional CDOs remained substantial.51 
The reason is that the stream of indicted capital cases continues 
at a steady rate, even as death sentencing diminishes.55 
Now, the disclaimer. Because the two studies used different da-
ta sources and sought to answer different questions, there is no 
simple, direct way to compare the two. While I am confident that 
the major trends in capital charging and plea bargaining that I 
identify are supported by the data, I do not claim to have under-
taken the kind of thorough, case-by-case review that would be 
necessary for more precise conclusions. Nor do I claim that this 
short symposium essay undertakes the kind of detailed statistical 
analysis that this topic deserves. Hence, my first observation 
about the "future" of Virginia's death penalty is that we need 
Virginia abolished parole. Id. Based on statements by a number of commonwealth's attor-
neys, JLARC believed that the option of life without parole had a significant impact on 
charging and plea decisions by prosecutors. Id. at 31. 
50. See id. at i-iii. The ABA assessment attempted a survey of charging practices by 
commonwealth's attorneys, but received few responses from prosecutors. ABA 
ASSESSMEN1', supra note 16, at xviii. 
51. VIDC REVIEW, supra note 3, at 2. 
52. Id. The author of this symposium essay serves as a member of the VIDC. 
53. Id. at 4. VIDC's principal source was the Supreme Court of Virginia's Circuit 
Court Case Management System, though the study highlights important gaps in that in-
formation. Id. at 4-5. To fill those gaps VIDC staff sought additional data directly from 
Circuit Court Clerks and from CDO case files. Id. 
54. Id. at 2 (concluding that the CDOs "are not overstaffed"). 
55. See id. at 6. 
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more complete data and a comprehensive study of capital charg-
ing and plea bargaining patterns before we can fully assess these 
trends. 
D. Comparing Capital Indictment Rates and Capital Trial Rates 
Across Twenty Years: Capital Charging Holds Steady, but 
Capital Trials Diminish 
In examining the JLARC and VIDC studies, this symposium 
essay aims to compare, across a twenty-year period, the discre-
tionary choices of Virginia prosecutors at two key stages in capi-
tal cases: the indictment stage and the pretrial (or plea bargain-
ing) stage. First, when presented with an arrest for a capital 
crime, how often do Virginia prosecutors seek an indictment for 
capital murder? I will call that the "capital indictment rate." Se-
cond, once a capital indictment is filed, how often does the case 
make it to a contested verdict where the death penalty remains at 
issue? That's the "capital trial rate." By comparing capital in-
dictment rates with capital trial rates, we can get a rough idea of 
how often capital charges are bargained away after indictment for 
a resolution less than death. Then, by comparing the data from 
the JLARC and VIDC studies, we can see how those choices have 
changed (or not changed) across a period of almost twenty years. 
To calculate a capital indictment rate, JLARC first had to iden-
tify and count the capital-eligible murder arrests from which a 
prosecutor might select cases for capital indictment.56 That turned 
out to be a difficult task because arrest warrants and police data-
bases do not readily indicate whether a murder includes the ele-
ments necessary to charge a capital crime. 57 After substantial ef-
fort, including examination of individual case files, and even some 
interviews with commonwealth's attorneys, JLARC identified 215 
arrests for capital-eligible crimes between 1995 and 1999, an av-
erage of forty-three per year. 58 
56. JLARC REPOR'l', supra note 6, at 31, app. C. 
57. Id. at 14, 20. JLARC looked at state police records of 970 murder arrests in an ef-
fort to identify which were "capital eligible." But the arrest records do not distinguish 
among types of murder. Id. at 20. Hence, to "approximate" the number of capital-eligible 
arrests, JLARC staff undertook the labor-intensive task of reviewing Sentencing Commis-
sion data and indictments. Id. In some cases they even interviewed prosecutors. Id. 
58. Id. at 14, 16-17, 19-20. 
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Out of that universe of 215 eligible cases, Virginia prosecutors 
obtained capital murder indictments in 170 cases, an average of 
thirty-four per year. 59 Hence JLARC calculated a capital indict-
ment rate of 79%.60 As JLARC summarized its finding, "nearly 
eight out of every 10 persons who were arrested for a capital eli-
gible crime were indicted for capital murder."61 While that per-
centage may seem high, at least to those who feel the death pen-
alty should be reserved for the "worst of the worst," JLARC's 
statistical findings were consistent with responses to surveys it 
sent to all 121 commonwealth's attorneys. Sixty percent respond-
ed that they "always seek a capital murder indictment when the 
elements of the offense warrant the charge."62 JLARC's findings 
suggest that, at least as of the late 1990s, Virginia prosecutors on 
the whole were disinclined to "winnow out" many potential capi-
tal cases at the indictment stage. 
Now let's move forward about fifteen years, through a period 
when death sentencing was declining by more than 80%.63 We 
might expect a parallel drop in the annual number of capital in-
dictments from the JLARC average of thirty-four per year.64 But 
the decline is much more modest. The VIDC study counted 131 
capital indictments from 2008 through October 2013, an average 
of about twenty-two per year.65 In other words, death charging de-
clined by only about 35% even as death sentencing declined by 
80%. Death charging is declining much more modestly than death 
sentencing. 
Still, we need to address another important variable before we 
can appreciate how little the capital indictment rate has changed 
over time. From how many capital-eligible arrests did prosecutors 
select those twenty-two per year for capital indictment? That 
question, unfortunately, is hard to answer directly without exam-
59. Id. at 16-17. 
60. Id. at 32. 
61. Id. at III. 
62. Id. at 31; see also ABAASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 118 & n.51 (quoting a news 
report of a commonwealth's attorney who often "charge[s] capital murder even if it's ques-
tionable as whether or not it fits in that category"). 
63. See Death Sentences by State/Year, supra note 3 (demonstrating a decline in 
death sentences from an average of five per year between 1995-1999 to less than one per 
year between 2004-2013). 
64. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
65. See VIDC HEVIEW, supra note 3, at app. B. 
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ining the individual facts of hundreds of murder arrests. But one 
key fact seems almost certain: the number of capital-eligible ar-
rests has gone down-a lot-since the mid-1990s. 66 That is be-
cause violent crime in general, and homicides in particular, has 
dropped dramatically across the past two decades. 67 Using the 
midpoints of the JLARC study (1997) and the VIDC study (2010) 
as points of reference, the annual number of arrests for murder in 
Virginia has dropped from 424 to 293, a decline of 30%.68 Assum-
ing the rate of capital-eligible murders goes up or down roughly 
at the same rate as murders in general, that would suggest that 
the annual pool of capital-eligible murder arrests has shrunk by 
30% during the years between the JLARC and VIDC studies. 
That would create an annual pool of about thirty capital-eligible 
murder arrests, from which Virginia prosecutors annually ob-
tained twenty-two capital murder indictments. That results in a 
capital indictment rate of 73% for the years 2009 to 2013, only a 
small step lower than the 79% calculated by JLARC for 1995 to 
1999. 
In sum, while capital indictments have declined by about a 
third from the late 1990s to the past few years, that decline is 
almost entirely attributable to the decline in violent crime across 
the same period. It is not because Virginia prosecutors are signif-
icantly more selective in their capital indictment decisions. 
Now to the second question: the capital trial rate. How many of 
those capital murder cases actually get to a contested life-or-
death verdict? The JLARC study of 1995-1999 cases documented 
the winnowing of 170 capital murder indictments down to sixty-
four cases where prosecutors actively sought the death penalty 
66. See, e.g., FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2013 tbl.1 (2014), available at http: 
//www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/ltable 
datadecoverviewpdf/table_l_crime_in_the_united_states_by _ volume_and_rate_per_ 10000 
O_inhabitants_l994-2013.xls (indicating that the murder rate in the United States has 
declined from 9.0 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 1994 to 4.5 murders per 100,000 in-
habitants in 2013). 
67. See id. (revealing that the number of violent crimes and murders in 2013 is signif-
icantly lower than the number of violent crimes and murders in 1994). 
68. Compare FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 286 
tbl.69 (1998), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/1997/97sec 
4.pdf, with FBI, CHIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2010, tbl.69 (2011), available at http://ww 
w .fbi.gov/ about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u. s/201 O/crime-in-the-u.s. -201O/tables/1 Otbl69.xls. 
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through a contested trial or sentencing.69 That's a capital trial 
rate of 38%.70 
Both the number and the rate of capital trials have dropped 
significantly since 1999. 'fhe available data on capital indictment 
dispositions from the VIDC study shows trials in about 19% of 
capital cases between 2008 and 2013.71 Even that number may 
substantially overstate the percentage of cases where the death 
penalty is actually contested through verdict. That is because half 
of those trials are bench trials. 72 In Virginia, a trial to the court 
occurs only where both parties agree to waive a jury.73 A defend-
ant's agreement to waive a jury sometimes accompanies a prose-
cutor's agreement not to argue for death. 71 
69. JLARC REPOR'r, supra note 6, at 17 fig. 7. 
70. If that number seems small think again. On average, noncapital cases go to trial 
at a much lower rate. Since parole was abolished in 1995, the rate of jury sentencing 
(which parallels the rate of jury trial) in felony cases has dipped well below 2%, and has 
dropped to about 4% in cases of crimes against the person. See VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N, 
2013 ANNUAL REPORT 30-31 (2013) [hereinafter VCSC REPORT], available at http://www. 
vcsc.virginia.gov/2013Annua1Report.pdf. 
71. The VIDC study itself did not analyze case dispositions. I was able to review the 
work papers for the VIDC study, which included spreadsheets from the Supreme Court of 
Virginia case management system, listing capital murder indictments from 2008 through 
2013, and including the disposition in most cases. See Spreadsheets Listing Capital Mur-
der Indictments from 2008 to 2013 (unpublished data) (on file with the Supreme Court of 
Virginia Case Management System). Where the spreadsheets did not record a disposition, 
I checked the Virginia Circuit Court Case Information website. Circuit Court Case Infor-
mation, VA. CTS. CASE INFO., http://wasdmz2.courts.state.va.us/CJISWeb/circuit.jsp (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2015). Finally, I included dispositions reported by CDOs and reflected in 
Appendix C to the VIDC study. VIDC REVIEW, supra note 3, at app. C. From that collec-
tion of sources I was able to identify dispositions in 100 cases that had been indicted as 
capital murder. John G. Douglass, Totals w/CCM Data (unpublished research notes) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Douglass Notes]. Of those, forty-three were resolved by 
guilty plea and twenty-four by nolle prosequi. Id. (In some of the nolle prossed cases I was 
able to identify a superseding indictment followed by guilty plea to a lesser charge). Nine 
other cases showed capital charges amended to first or second degree murder. Id. Five 
cases were listed as "other." Id. 'rhere were nine jury trials and ten tried by "judge with 
witnesses." Id. The breakdown of bench trials versus jury trials appears roughly constant 
since the JLARC study, which documented jury verdicts in 53% of cases where prosecutors 
sought death. See JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 49, 52 fig.18. 
72. Douglass Notes, supra note 71 (indicating that there were nine jury trials and ten 
bench trials). 
73. VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.2-257 (Cum. Supp. 2014). 
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657, 659 (Pa. 1998); Cary Aspin-
wall, Kevin Sweat Won't Face Death Penalty in Killings of Weleetha Girls, Fiancee, TULSA 
WOHLD (July 11, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/kevin-sweat-wo 
n-t-face-death-penalty-in-killings-of/article_320f9865-98f3-5b7f-83cl-5e6408e5f383.html; 
Mark Walters, Judge Denies New Trial for Adams Man Convicted of Murder; Appeal Filed, 
EVENING SUN (Jan. 20, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://www.eveningsun.com/local/ci_24949615/ 
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In sum, when presented with a capital-eligible crime, Virginia 
commonwealth's attorneys continue to seek capital indictments at 
a relatively steady rate. Since the late 1990s, their capital in-
dictment rate has dipped only slightly, from 79% to 73%. 75 But as 
the years have passed, Virginia prosecutors increasingly have 
chosen not to pursue death all the way through a contested trial 
and sentencing. The capital trial rate has been sliced in half, from 
38% to 19% and the jury trial rate is even lower. 76 Juries now 
make the death penalty decision in only about 9% of Virginia cas-
es that start with a capital murder indictment.77 
E. Post-Indictment Plea Bargaining Increasingly Resolves 
Capital Cases Short of a Death Sentence 
An increasingly small percentage of capital murder indict-
ments ultimately leads to a trial where death is at issue. Why? 
The most likely-perhaps the quite obvious-answer is plea bar-
gaining. 
Of course, not all of the winnowing that occurs after indictment 
and before trial is the result of agreement. Prosecutors sometimes 
make the unilateral decision to take death off the table. 78 And 
judge-denies-new-trial-adams-man-convicted-murder. Some of these bench trials, in the 
vocabulary of practitioners, are "slow guilty pleas." See, e.g., Lewis v. Mazurkiewicz, 915 
F.2d 106, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1990). 
75. Compare JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 fig. 7 (showing that there were 170 
capital murder indictments out of 215 capital-eligible offenses between 1995 and 1999, 
indicating a capital indictment rate of 79%), with VIDC REVIEW, supra. note 3, at app. B 
(indicating that there were an average of twenty-two capital indictments per year between 
2008 and 2013, which is a capital indictment rate of 73% assuming there were approxi-
mately thirty capital-eligible murder arrests per year during the same time frame). 
76. Compare JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 fig.7 (illustrating a winnowing of 170 
capital murder indictments down to 64 cases of prosecutors seeking the death penalty, a 
capital trial rate of 38%), with supra note 52 (tracing my analysis of trials in Virginia be-
tween 2008 and 2013, which reveals a 19% capital trial rate). 
77. My calculation of a 9% jury trial rate for the years 2008 through 2013 appears 
roughly consistent. with data from the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse ("VCCC"). The 
VCCC data documents seventeen jury trials in the seven years from 2005 through 2011, 
resulting in eight death sentences. See ABA ASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 142 (citing 
VCCC Data). If we assume an annual rate of twenty-five capital indictments, seventeen 
jury trials in that span would amount to about 9% of cases. 
78. See, e.g., Michael Gordon, State Will Not Seeh Death Penalty Against Bianca 
'Tanner's Boyfriend, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserv 
er.com/2014/11/20/5329443/state-will-not-seek-death-penalty .html#. VG-4vlfF-IO; Elliot C. 
McLaughlin, Prosecution Will Not Seeh Death Penalty in Georgia Hot Car Death, CNN 
(Oct. 9, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/24/justice/georgia-ross-harris-hot-car-
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even defendants facing capital charges sometimes plead guilty 
"straight up" with no bargain in place.70 Still, the available data 
confirms what experience and anecdotal reports suggest: that 
such unilateral post-indictment decisions probably account for a 
small number of cases.80 The decline in capital trials results most-
ly from prosecutors' increasing willingness to trade capital charg-
es for guilty pleas. 
Why are Virginia prosecutors more willing to resolve capital 
cases short of a death sentence? Life without parole surely has 
made a difference. For many prosecutors, no doubt, the option of 
life without parole diminishes the need for death sentences by 
providing a means to ensure that the most dangerous offenders 
remain in prison for life.81 So, plea bargaining that tilts away 
from death seems increasingly likely once life without parole is on 
the table. 
But life without parole only partially explains the decline in 
contested capital trials. Virginia abolished parole in 1995.82 So, to 
the extent that the life-without-parole option impacts charging 
and plea bargaining, we would expect that the JLARC study of 
cases from 1995 to 1999 would already account for most of that 
death-penalty/. I am unaware of data which would document how often such unilateral 
choices by prosecutors occur after a capital indictment. My conversations with practition-
ers, both prosecutors and defense attorneys, suggest they are relatively rare. 
79. Virginia's latest death sentence came in such a case. See Gleason v. Common-
wealth, 726 S.E.2d 351, 352-53 (Va. 2012); see also Frank Green, Robert Charles Gleason 
Jr., Who Strangled 'l'wo Fellow Prison Inmates, Executed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 
17, 2013, 12:00AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/robert-charles-gleason-jr-who-
strangled-two-fellow-prison-inmates/article_2be8dc8d-92a6-5b8d-ab68-d2fbe9ae8c4f.html 
(explaining that Gleason plead guilty and told his lawyers not to oppose the death penal-
ty). 
80. Unfortunately, the available data made it difficult to identify bargained outcomes 
with precision. JLARC did not distinguish cases winnowed after indictment by negotiated 
guilty plea from cases in which prosecutors unilaterally chose not to pursue a death sen-
tence after capital indictment. And the VIDC study was not intended to address case dis-
positions. Accounts from prosecutors and defense lawyers confirm that dismissal or 
amendment of capital charges typically occurs pursuant to plea agreement and coincides 
with a guilty plea to amended charges (usually first degree murder). In reviewing Circuit 
Court Case Information data on case dispositions, I was able to confirm that pattern in a 
number of cases reported as resolved by guilty plea or nolle prosequi. Douglass Notes, su-
pra note 71. 
81. See JLARC REPOHT, supra note 6, at 12 (reporting views of some prosecutors that 
the option of life without parole decreased the likelihood they would pursue the death 
penalty). 
82. Id. 
2015] DEATH AS A BARGAINING CHIP 887 
impact.83 But the capital trial rate has dropped by half since that 
study.84 Something else has happened in the past fifteen years to 
increase the chances that prosecutors will choose to resolve capi-
tal cases short of a contested trial with death still on the table. 
That "something," most likely, is a vigorous defense. The most 
significant change in capital litigation since the days of the 
JLARC study has been in capital case defense. In 2002 the Vir-
ginia General Assembly authorized the creation of four regional 
CDOs under the supervision of the VIDC.85 In all capital cases 
since 2004, Virginia courts have been required to appoint two de-
fense attorneys, including one from a CD0.86 State funds were 
appropriated to staff CDOs with experienced, specialized defense 
counsel and to provide for investigators and mitigation special-
ists. At about the same time, Virginia adopted detailed standards 
for appointment of counsel, increased compensation, and removed 
fee caps for appointed counsel in capital cases.87 It is no accident 
that the decline in death sentencing coincides with these reforms. 
A capable and vigorous defense clearly makes a difference, and 
that defense no doubt accounts-at least in part-for the in-
creased willingness of prosecutors to resolve capital cases short of 
death. 
F. Plea Bargaining: The "Locality Effect" 
Virginia has 121 elected commonwealth's attorneys, one for 
each independent city or county.88 Their views on death penalty 
charging differ substantially. Many feel it is their public duty to 
pursue a capital indictment whenever the facts allow. 89 Others 
exercise discretion to limit capital charges to the worst of the 
83. Indeed, that is one reason the JLARC study chose 1995 as its starting point: to 
control for any influences that abolition of parole might bring to prosecutors' choices to 
pursue the death penalty. Id. 
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
85. See ABAASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 143-44. 
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (Cum. Supp. 2014). There are exceptions where the 
RCDO has a conflict of interest or where the court finds that appointment of non-CDO 
counsel is "necessary to attain the ends of justice." Id.§ 19.2-163.4. 
87. See ABAASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 146; JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 24. 
88. VA. CODE ANN.§ 15.2-1626. 
89. The JLARC staff surveyed commonwealth's attorneys and reported that "60 per-
cent indicated that they always seek a capital murder indictment when the elements of 
the offense warrant the charge." JLARC REPOR'l', supra note 6, at 31. 
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worst.90 Many defer to the choices of victims' families. 91 Some 
choose to avoid capital prosecutions simply because they are too 
• 92 
expensive. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that location plays a big 
role in determining who faces capital indictment and who ulti-
mately receives a death sentence. The principal finding of the 
JLARC study was that "[l]ocation, more than any other factor, 
impacted the probability that prosecutors would actually seek the 
death penalty for capital murder cases."93 
While capital indictment policies account for some of this "lo-
cality effect," most of the difference comes at the plea bargaining 
stage. According to JLARC, the differential among localities be-
came more pronounced after indictment: capital indictment rates 
ranged from 72% in "high density" (urban) areas to 85% in each 
"medium density" (suburban) and "low density" (rural) areas, a 
fairly modest differential. 91 But things changed as cases moved 
down the capital litigation funnel. The JLARC study found that 
prosecutors in suburban localities were almost three times more 
likely to seek the death penalty all the way through a contested 
trial or sentencing than prosecutors in urban localities. 95 In other 
words, prosecutors differed only a little in their decisions whether 
to indict capital cases. They differed a lot in deciding whether to 
bargain for less than death. Hence, primarily as a result of differ-
ences in the willingness of prosecutors to plea bargain in capital 
cases, death sentences were disproportionately a suburban and 
rural phenomenon in Virginia, at least as late as 1999.96 
90. See ABA AsSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 118 (describing detailed pre-indictment 
review practices in one jurisdiction). 
91. See id. 
92. See id. at 388 (noting the time and expense involved in prosecuting a defendant 
with mental retardation). 
93. JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 29. 
94. Id. at 32 fig.11. 
95. See id. at 39 fig.15. 
96. Id. at 28. JLARC noted that such "outcomes ... are not easily reconciled on the 
grounds of fairness." Id. at Preface. 
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II. THE FUTURE OF VIRGINIA'S DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING 
FAIRNESS AND CONSIDERING COSTS 
889 
Most public debate about the death penalty focuses on death 
sentences and executions.97 Those, after all, pose fundamental 
questions: Should the state take life as a sanction for crime? Do 
we have the capacity to reliably distinguish the guilty from the 
innocent? Do we make fair choices between those who live and 
those who die? My aim in this short symposium essay has been to 
point out a reality that gets obscured in that debate. Death sen-
tences are really the tip of a much larger iceberg of capital litiga-
tion. Most of the time, and increasingly over the past twenty 
years, the practical function of the death penalty is to serve as 
leverage in a plea bargain.98 
I offer that as an observation of fact, not as judgment condemn-
ing or applauding the trend. 99 My modest suggestion to policy-
makers is simply that they should consider the iceberg as well as 
the tip. We need a careful study to see if our current practices, 
which depend so heavily on plea bargaining judgments of inde-
pendently elected prosecutors across Virginia, are fair when 
viewed in statewide perspective. And we need to consider the 
97. See, e.g., Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty. 
aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (demonstrating that the major issues of contention with 
the death penalty relate to sentences and execution). 
98. See supra Part I.E; see also Christopher Solgan, Life or Death: The Voluntariness 
of Guilty Pleas by Capital Defendants and the New Yorh Perspective, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. R'rs. 699, 702 (2000) (explaining that prosecutors use the death penalty in plea 
agreements); see also Death Penalty Often a Plea Bargaining Tool, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1110 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (demonstrat-
ing that in Ohio most death penalty indictments end in plea agreements). See generally 
Joseph L. Hoffmann et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2313 (2001) (discussing the development and prevalence of the death penalty as leverage 
in plea bargaining). 
99. There is a vigorous debate about the appropriateness of plea bargaining in capital 
cases. A prominent opponent argues that plea bargaining "mocks" or "devalues" the moral 
position of death penalty proponents, promotes inequality of treatment, increases costs 
and waste, and devalues the role of defense counsel. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bar-
gaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 674, 677, 680 (2009). The Supreme 
Court, by contrast, has held that a defendant's choice to plead guilty to avoid the death 
penalty does not make the plea involuntary. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 
(1970). 
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costs, and cost-effectiveness, of a system which· charges death 
more than twenty times for each death sentence it produces. 100 
A. Fairness: Does Winnowing by Plea Negotiation Produce Fair 
Results? 
Virginia's system of capital litigation winnows out nineteen of 
twenty capital charges for every death sentence it produces, 
largely based on plea-bargaining choices by independently elected 
commonwealth's attorneys. 101 When JLARC looked at that process 
for cases now almost twenty years old, it found that the outcomes 
"are not easily reconciled on the grounds of fairness." 102 Locality, 
more than any other factor, determined the likelihood that a 
prosecutor would seek a death sentence. 103 
Without another effort like JLARC's detailed statistical study, 
it is hard to say whether this locality effect has become more or 
less acute since 1999, or how it may evolve in the future. Ironical-
ly, as plea bargaining resolves a greater percentage of cases, we 
would expect that differences across localities would diminish. 
Stated more bluntly, if virtually every case results in a bargain 
for a life sentence, there is little difference in outcomes across lo-
calities. 
But that kind of future seems unlikely. Inevitably, some cases 
will not be bargained, and prosecutors will differ in choosing 
those cases. The trickle of death sentences we have seen in the 
past decade still tilts toward a few, primarily suburban jurisdic-
tions.101 The list of capital indictments in recent years shows com-
paratively few cases in the state's urban centers and higher num-
bers in areas of medium or low population density. 105 If the 
experience of other states is an indicator, the locality effect will 
linger, even as death sentencing diminishes. 106 We may choose to 
100. Sec supra Part I.D. 
101. VIDC REVIEW, supra note 3, at apps. A-B; see supra Part I.D. 
102. JLARC REPOHT, supra note 6, at Preface. 
103. Id. at 29. 
104. Prince William and Fairfax Counties account for six of the sixteen death sentences 
in Virginia since 2004. VCCC Data, supra note 20, at Capital Convictions table. 
105. See Spreadsheets Listing Capital Murder Indictments from 2008 to 2013 (un-
published data) (on file with the Supreme Court of Virginia Case Management System). 
106. See RICHAHD DIETEH, THE 2% DEATH PENAL'rY: How A MINOHITY OF COUNTIES 
PHODUCE MOST DEATH CASES AT ENOHMOUS COSTS TO ALL 9 (2013), available at http:// 
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defend that system as a consequence of local democracy. As 
JLARC observed, it may be harder to defend on grounds of fair-
101 
ness. 
Finally, one other factor should give us pause as plea bargain-
ing becomes the principal means for choosing life or death. A bar-
gain requires the defendant's agreement. Some defendants land 
on death row not because the prosecutor failed to offer a plea to a 
life sentence, but because the defendant rejected the offer. In-
deed, experienced capital defense lawyers estimate that more 
than half of defendants sentenced to death were offered a plea to 
life along the way. 108 At best this system promotes a level of ran-
domness in outcomes of capital cases. At worst it tilts death sen-
tences toward defendants who get poor advice from their lawyers, 
defendants with mental deficiencies who fail to appreciate the 
hard choices they face, or defendants with plausible claims of in-
109 
nocence. 
B. The Cost Efficiency of Winnowing Capital Cases by Plea 
Bargain 
We think of plea bargaining as a cost-saving device. When we 
look only at a single case, we see that a guilty plea saves the cost 
of trial and (sometimes) of lengthy appeals. But a different pic-
ture may emerge if we look at capital cases on the whole, adopt-
ing the kind of perspective a legislator might take in assessing 
the cost efficiency of any criminal justice policy. 110 
Start with costs. Even in a system with heavy reliance on plea 
bargaining, the choice to bring a capital charge results in sub-
stantially higher cost than the noncapital alternative.m That is 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf (demonstrating the lack of 
proportion in death penalty sentencing between counties). 
107. JL.ARC REPORT, supra note 6, at Preface. 
108. Altschuler, supra note 99, at 671-72. 
109. Thaxton, supra note 25, at 490 (suggesting that cognitive and emotional deficits 
make many capital defendants less likely to accept favorable plea bargains). 
110. Unlike several death penalty states, Virginia has not yet undertaken that kind of 
cost-benefit assessment. A recent Kansas study concluded that defending a death penalty 
case costs about four times as much as defending a capital-eligible murder case where 
death was not sought. JUD. COUNCIL, KAN. LEGISLATURE, REPOHT OF THE JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL DEATH PENALTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 15 (2014), available at http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/documents/KSCost2014.pdf. 
111. See id. 
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primarily because so much of the added cost of a capital case 
must be spent before trial. 112 A recent study in th_e federal system 
estimated that capital cases ending in a guilty plea were more 
than three times as costly as noncapital cases resolved by trial. 113 
Studies from several states echo that finding. 111 Therefore, Virgin-
ia's prevailing pattern of waiting until after indictment to winnow 
out most capital charges virtually insures high costs, even as it 
produces few death sentences. 
Now consider what we "buy" for those costs. Mostly we buy 
bargaining leverage. Without detailed study, however, it is hard 
to know what practical difference that bargaining leverage really 
makes. Do we get fewer costly trials? Probably not. There is no 
solid evidence that bringing a capital charge increases the likeli-
hood of resolving the case through a guilty plea. 115 Indeed, the op-
posite may be true.116 Do we get higher sentences for murderers? 
For some, probably yes. It does seem likely that, on the whole, 
prosecutors who charge capital murder will obtain higher bar-
gained-for sentences than prosecutors who negotiate pleas from 
112. See 'l'EHANCE D. Mrnnrn, DEP"l' OF CHIMINAL JUS'l'ICE, UNIV. OF NEV., LAS VEGAS, 
Estimates of Time Spent in Capital and Non-Capital Murder Cases: A Statistical Analysis 
of Survey Data from Clarh County Defense Attorneys 4 tbl.1 (2012) (showing an expendi-
ture of two to four times the attorney hours on the pretrial stage of a capital trial than all 
other stages combined); see also MOLLY '!'HEADWAY JOHNSON & LAUHAL L. HOOPER, FED. 
JUDICIAL C•m., RESOURCE GUIIJE FOR MANAGING CAPITAL CASES-VOLUME I: FEDERAL 
DEATH PENALTY 'l'HIALS 2 (2004) ("[Capital] cases require early judicial management and 
substantial pretrial planning because they may involve the most severe form of punish-
ment that society can inflict on its members-death. The process by which the prosecution 
determines whether it will seek the death penalty is itself time-consuming and demands 
considerable effort of both the prosecution and the defense.''). 
113. Thaxton, supra note 25, at 545. 
114. Id. 
115. Compare Ilyana Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bar-
gaining in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Pun-
ishment, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 140 (2006) (concluding that threat of death penalty 
did not increase the likelihood of a guilty plea), with Thaxton, supra note 25, at 475-76 
(concluding that the threat of the death penalty increases the probability of a plea agree-
ment by 20-25%, an amount insufficient to offset the added costs of capital cases that go 
to trial). 
116. In Virginia, despite the high number of bargained-for resolutions in capital cases, 
the rate of trial in capital cases still exceeds the trial rate for noncapital cases. See supra 
Part I.E. I estimate a capital jury trial rate of about 8% and a similar bench trial rate of 
8% in the past five years. See supra Part I.D. The rate of jury trials in Virginia in felony 
cases in 2013 was 1.2%, and the rate for felony crimes against the person was 4.4%. VCSC 
REPORT, supra note 70, at 30-31. Bench trials accounted for 9% of all felony convictions. 
Id. 
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the sta:i;ting point of an indictment for first degree murder. 117 But 
the difference may be more symbolic than real. The threat of a 
death sentence may induce a plea to life without parole. Still, 
even without that leverage, a plea to first degree murder likely 
will keep the convict in prison well into old age. 118 The practical 
difference may be a few years of geriatric release. 
Virginia's budget-makers may differ in their assessments of 
these costs and benefits. My point is simply that they should not 
undertake that assessment without recognizing the pervasive in-
fluence of current charging and plea-bargaining practices. 
CONCLUSION-A MODEST SUGGESTION FOR REFORM BY 
NARROWING THE FUNNEL 
Virginia could substantially reduce the statewide costs of its 
death penalty system with little change in the ultimate outcome 
of capital cases. To do so would require winnowing out at the in-
dictment stage some of the cases that currently get winnowed af-
ter indictment; narrowing the top of our capital litigation funnel 
before we spend millions litigating cases that will be bargained 
down to lesser sentences anyway. We could accomplish that 
through a variety of means, steps that would bring the added 
benefit of consistency to a system now characterized by differ-
ences based on locality. 
Without changing the fundamental structure of local control, 
we could encourage more exacting review at the indictment stage. 
A few commonwealth's attorneys have developed policies for that 
purpose. 119 At the federal level, the Department of Justice re-
quires extensive pre-indictment review. 120 An ABA study recom-
mended that Virginia commonwealth's attorneys develop advisory 
guidelines or consultative processes to guide discretion in bring-
117. See Kuziemko, supra note 115, at 116, 140. 
118. On average, defendants convicted of "more serious" first degree murder in Virginia 
serve forty-five years. VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N, A DECADE OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN 
VIRGINIA 2, available at http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/Mar_05/'l'IS_Brochure.pdf (last visit-
ed Feb. 27, 2015). 
119. ABA ASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 117-19. 
120. See DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL 9-10.030-.040 available at http: 
//www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/ 1Omcrm.htm#9-10. 030 (last 
updated April 2014). 
894 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:873 
ing capital charges. 121 Some states have adopted similar guide-
lines.122 Any of these steps would help to address the concerns 
over fairness that JLARC highlighted more than a decade ago, 
and save money in the process. 
There is a simpler and more effective way to limit capital liti-
gation costs with little change in outcomes. Remove robbery, 
standing alone, as a predicate for capital murder. 123 That statuto-
ry change alone would reduce the iceberg of capital litigation by 
about half. 12·1 The JLARC study found that robbery-murder cases 
account for more capital murder indictments than all other predi-
cates combined.125 Yet cases where robbery is the only predicate 
almost never result in a death sentence. 126 Indeed, had Virginia 
made that change to its capital murder statute ten years ago, it 
would have saved millions in cost without affecting a single death 
sentence. 127 It would have made our system more consistent 
across localities, and we would have preserved the charging au-
thority of commonwealth's attorneys. 
Capital cases are expensive. They should be with so much at 
stake. I do not suggest that we reduce costs by cutting corners in 
investigation, prosecution, or defense of individual cases. Nor do I 
argue that plea bargaining has no place in capital cases. I only 
observe that Virginia's capital litigation system has achieved a 
very costly equilibrium. We indict a comparatively high number 
of death cases. Then, after substantial expense, we almost always 
bargain them away for noncapital results. We have invested 
heavily in a death penalty that serves mostly as a bargaining 
chip. As we consider the future of Virginia's death penalty, that 
state of affairs should concern policy makers, regardless of their 
views on the death penalty. 
121. See ABAASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 120 & n.63. 
122. Id. at 120 n.63. 
123. This would mean repealing Virginia Code section 18.2-31(4) (Hepl. Vol. 2014). 
124. The JLAHC study found that 56% of capital murder indictments had robbery as 
the sole predicate. JLAHC REPORT, supra note 6, at 30 fig.10. 
125. The JLARC study found that 56% of capital murder indictments had robbery as 
the sole predicate. JLAHC REPORT, supra note 6, at 30. 
126. See VCCC Data, supra note 20. 
127. Id. 
